

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 TEL AV 04204 01 OF 02 260755Z

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ACTION SS-30

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P R 251300Z JUL 74

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3300

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 4204

EXDIS

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, IS, JO

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FONMIN ALLON

REF: STATE 159882

SUMMARY: I CALLED ON FONMIN ALLON JULY 24 TO DISCUSS INTERALIA, JULY 23 KNESSET DEBATE ON JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN ISSUE. ALLON ASSESSED SIGNIFICANCE OF LATEST GOI DECISION ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH JORDAN BY NOTING THAT A) AFTER SEVEN YEARS AN ISRAELI CABINET HAD FINALLY DEBATED IN DEPTH AND REACHED DECISION ON MAJOR ISSUE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARABS, B) "PALESTINIANA" OR "PALESTINIAN IDENTIFY" WERE NO LONGER TABOO CONCEPTS, C) JORDAN AND US COULD BE ASSURED THAT GOI WAS NOT IGNORING OR EXCLUDING JORDAN AND , D) ISRAEL WAS READY TO NEGOTIATE WITH JORDAN OVER BORDER AND TO GIVE BACK TERRITORY. AS TO KNESSET DEBATE, ALLON STATED THAT HE DSAGREED WITH DAYAN'S CONCEPTS FOR "FUNCTIONAL PARTITION" OF WEST BANK (SEPTEL). ALLON NOTED THAT HE HAD DEFUSED LIKUD AND NRP ENTHUSIASM FOR DAYAN'S POSITION BY TELLING KNESSET THAT DAYAN ENVISAGED NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING RETURN OF EXTENSIVE TERRITORY TO JORDAN. IN VIEWING DEMOGRAPHIC, GEOGRAPHIC AND SECURITY COMPONENTS OF ALLON PLAN, ALLON STRESSED THE OCTOBER WAR HAD CONFIRMED NEED FOR "STRATEGIC DEPTH" ON WEST BANK AND EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF SETTLEMENTS ALONG HILL LINE OVERLOOKING JORDAN RIVER. HE SAID HIS PLAN, WHICH TOOK ISRAELI SECURITY NEEDS INTO ACCOUNT, REPRESENTED MAXIMUM THAT ANY ISRAELI GOVT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 04204 01 OF 02 260755Z

COULD AGREE TO RETURN TO JORDAN. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALLON WILL

BE FLOATING HIS PLAN IN WASHINGTON AS A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH JORDAN.. END SUMMARY.

2. ALLON INITIATED THE CONVERSATION BY STATING THAT HE WOULD BE LEAVING ON JULY 25 AT 1300 FOR LONDON FOR A PRIVATE VISIT TO SEE HIS CHILDREN. HE WOULD THEN FLY DIRECT TO WASHINGTON, ARRIVING AT DULLES ON OR ABOUT 1600 SUNDAY, JULY 28. HE NOTED THAT HE WOULD HAVE MONDAY TO REST BEFORE HIS FIRST MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY ON TUESDAY, JULY 30. WITH THE TRIP TO LONDON AND THE HOLIDAY ON MONDAY, ALLON EXPECTED TO BE "FIT AND TOUGH" FOR HIS TUESDAY MEETING.

3. I ASKED ALLON FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE JUST CONCLUDED KNESSET DEBATE ON THE CABINET COMMUNIQUE RE NEGOTIATIONS WITH JORDAN. ALLON SAID HE WOULD OF COURSE RESPOND TO MY REQUEST, BUT WONDERED WHAT OUR VIEWS WERE ON THE GOI POSITION, I RESPONDED DRAWING ON STATE 159882. AT THIS POINT WE WERE INTERRUPTED SINCE ALLON WAS CALLED TO THE KNESSET FLOOR FOR A VOTE. JUST BEFORE LEAVING,

HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE POSITION WHICH I HAD OUTLINED TO HIM. UPON HIS RETURN, I REMARKED THAT I THOUGHT THAT HIS APPARENT CONCERN OVER WHAT I HAD SAID WAS PERHAPS DUE TO A MISUNDERSTANDING. I WENT OVER THE GROUND AGAIN THIS TIME EMPHASIZING THE LANGUAGE IN PARA 1 TO THE EFFECT THAT THIS IS THE TIME FOR "QUIET DIPLOMACY, NOT PUBLIC DISCUSSION." ALLON SAID THAT INDEED HE HAD MISUNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION AND HE COULD OUR POSITION AND HE COULD NOT AGREE MORE THAT " THIS IS A TIME FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY, NOT PUBLIC DISCUSSION." LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, ALLON INFORMED ME OF HIS MEETING SCHEDULED FOR JULY 25 WITH ISRAELI EDITORS DESIGNED TO EMPHASIZE THIS POINT TO THEM.)

4. ALLON SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE TO COMMENT PUBLICLY ON THE GOI CABINET COMMUNIQUE FOR TWO REASONS: (1) IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE US NOT TO BE PUT IN A POSITION OF APPARENTLY INTERPRETING THE GOI POSITION PUBLICLY FOR THE ARABS; AND (2) THE ISRAELIS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROPENSITY OF THE ARABS AND THE SOVIETS TO DISTORT US PRONOUNCEMENTS CONCERNING THE "LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIANS" FOR THEIR OWN PROPAGANDA ENDS. I REMINDED ALLON THAT WE HAD NO INTENTIONS OF MAKING AN ANNOUNCEMENT BUT THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO SAY SOMETHING IF ASKED

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 04204 01 OF 02 260755Z

BY THE PRESS. AS CONCERNS HIS FIRST POINT, I DREW TO HIS ATTENTION OUR EMPHASIS ON "WELCOMING" ISRAEL'S READINESS TO NEGOTIATE WITH JORDAN. AS CONCERNS THE JORDAN. AS CONCERNS THE LANGUAGE RE THE " INTERESTS" OF THE PALESTINIANS, I SAID THAT, AS HE KNEW, THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN THIS FORMULATION.

5. ALLON THEN TURNED TO THE CABINET COMMUNIQUE EMPHASIZING THE FOLLOWING : (1) SEVEN YEARS AFTER THE SIX DAY WAR, THE ISRAELI

CABINET FINALLY STUDIED AND DEBATED IN DEPTH A MAJOR ISSUE CONCERNING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ARABS. AFTER THAT PROCESS, THE CABINET REACHED A DECISION. THE PROCESS ITSELF WAS IMPORTANT. (2) PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND POLITICALLY, THE WORDS " PALESTINIAN" OR "PALESTINIAN IDENTITY" ARE NO LONGER TABOO. HE RECALLED, IN THIS RESPECT, MRS MEIR'S TOTAL DISMISSAL OF THE SUBJECT BY REMARKING THAT SHE TOO WAS A PALESTINIAN. (3) JORDAN AND THE US SHOULD NOW BE REASSURED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT EXCLUDE OR IGNORE JORDAN. FURTHERMORE, ISRAEL IS PREAPRED TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN THE CONTEXT OF A SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN. (4) A SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN MEANS A NEGOTIATION WITH JORDAN OVER BORDERS. THE GOVT, THEREFORE, ALSO BROKE THIS POLITICAL TABOO SINCE IT IS CLEARLY PREPARED TO GIVE BACK TERRITORY.

6 ALLON NOTED THAT IN THE CABINET HE TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO ELIMINATE A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE COMMUNIQUE WHICH WOULD HAVE STATED THAT "THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR A THIRD STATE BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL." HIS POSITION WAS THAT THE COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE KEPT POSITIVE AND THAT THIS WAS ALREADY IMPLIED IN THE PROPOSED LANGUAGE. HIS POSITION WAS UPHELD BY MAJORITY VOTE IN THE CABINET. ALLON CONTINUED THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT IT IS TELLING HUSSEIN WHAT KIND OF A STATE JORDAN SHOULD BE OR WHAT KIND OF AN ARRANGEMENT HE MIGHT HAVE WITH THE WEST BANK. THIS IS UP TO HIM, HE SAID. FINALLY, HE NOTED THAT THE CABIET COMMUNIQUE ALSO REPRESENTS A RESTATEMENT OF ISRAEL'S POSITION THAT IT WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT NEGOTIATEE WITH THE PLO SINCE THE PLO DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST. (I DID NOT THINK IT USEFUL TO ASK ALLON IF ISRAEL WOULD CONSIDER NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO IF THIS ORGANIZATION SHOULD RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. THIS IS REALLY A NON-STARTER SINCE THE ISRAELI ANSWER IS ALWAYS THAT IF THE PLO DID RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, IT WOULD NOT BE THE PLO. NOTHING HAS CHANGED IN THIS RESPECT FROM MRS MEIR'S

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 04204 01 OF 02 260755Z

FIRM VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT.)

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SECRET

PAGE 01 TEL AV 04204 02 OF 02 260843Z

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P R 251300Z JUL 74

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 4204

EXDIS

7. I THANKED ALLON FOR HIS CLARIFICATION ON THE CABINET COMMUNIQUE NOTING THAT AS I HAD SAID EARLIER, THE US WELCOMED ISRAEL'S DECLARED READINESS TO NEGOTIATE WITH JORDAN. I NOTED THAT NOTHING IN THE COMMUNIQUE NOR IN HIS COMMENTS TOUCHED ON THE SUBJECT OF POSSIBLE TIMING OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JORDAN. ALLON REPLIED THAT WHEN HE IS IN WASHINGTON HE WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF TIMING OF NEGOTIATIONS EITHER WITH JORDAN OR WITH EGYPT-- OR CONCEIVABLY BOTH. HE STATED THAT WHERE THIS ALL COMES OUT DEPENDED UPON THE OUTCOME OF THE PROCESS IN WASHINGTON WHICH WOULD BEGIN WITH HIS VISIT. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE GOI WAS COMMITTED TO GO TO NEW ELECTIONS BEFORE AGREEING TO ANY PLAN WITH JORDAN RELATING TO THE WEST BANK. IN RESPONSE TO MY INQUIRY, HE ADMITTED THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE POLITICALLY FOR ISRAEL TO PROCEED NEXT ON EGYPTIAN SECOND PHASE TO GIVE MORE TIME FOR RABIN GOVERNMENT TO STRENGTHEN ITSELF BEFORE ELECTIONS MUST BE HELD.

8. TURNING TO THE KNESSET DEBATE ON THE COMMUNIQUE, ALLON NOTED THAT HIS OWN REMARKS WERE KEYED TO DAYAN'S STATEMENTS. HE STATED THAT AFTER THREE YEARS, DAYAN AGAIN PUBLICLY REFERRED TO HIS "PLAN" FOR THE WEST BANK WHICH IS BEST DESCRIBED AS "FUNCTIONAL PARTITION." IT INVOLVED A MIXTURE OF JORDANIAN SOVEREIGNTY, APPARENTLY UNLIMITED SETTLEMENT BY THE JEWS, AND CONTINUED ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF MILITARY STRATEGIC AREAS. ALLON SAID THAT HE WAS AGAINST THE PLAN WHEN DAYAN FIRST SURFACED IT, AND IS STILL AGAINST IT. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, BELIEVE IT NECESSARY OR

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 TEL AV 04204 02 OF 02 260843Z

DESIRABLE DURING THE DEBATE TO ATTACK DAYAN'S PLAN. IN THIS RESPECT, HE PLANS TO SEE DAYAN PRIVATELY TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER. RATHER, ALLON HAD NOTED AMONGST THE LIKUD AND NRP A FLUTTER OF EXCITEMENT WHEN DAYAN SPOKE SINCE IT WAS CLEAR THE RIGHT-WING OPPOSITION WAS INTERPRETING DAYAN'S COMMENTS AS THE BEGINNING OF A SPLIT IN THE ALIGNMENT OVER THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH JORDAN. ALLON'S OVERRIDING CONCERN IN MAKING HIS REMARKS WAS TO REMIND THE OPPOSITION

THAT DAYAN'S PROPOSALS ALSO ENVISAGED NEGOTIATIONS WITH JORDAN AND THE RETURN OF JORDANIAN SOVEREIGNTY TO LARGE AREAS OF THE WEST BANK. ALLON STATED THAT HIS WORDS FOUND THEIR MARK AND THE BUDDING EXCITEMENT IN THE RANKS OF THE OPPOSITION QUICKLY DISSIPATED.

9. ALLON ALSO DISCUSSED THE "ALLON PLAN" IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL. HE STATED THE BELIEF THAT HE COULD GET CABINET APPROVAL FOR THIS PLAN AND SUBSEQUENT APPROVAL BY THE ISRAELI PEOPLE (PRESUMABLY IN A NEW ELECTION). HE POINTED OUT THAT HIS PLAN WAS BASED ON DEMOGRAPHY, GEOGRAPHY, AND MILITARY SECURITY. HE NOTED THAT HE AND DAYAN HAVE EXACTLY THE SAME AIM IN AVOIDING ANNEXATION OF TERRITORY HEAVILY POPULATED BY ARABS WHICH WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP TOWARD THE CREATION OF A BINATIONAL STATE, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH ISRAEL REJECTED. ALLON SAID THAT WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS (HE MENTIONED JERICHO), THE HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS OF THE WEST BANK LIE TO THE WEST OF THE STRATEGIC HILL LINE. ISRAEL CANNOT PUSH TO THE HILL LINE AND ANNEX TERRITORY SINCE IT DOESN'T WANT ALL THOSE ARABS. BUT ISRAEL MUST HAVE STRATEGIC DEPTH. AT THIS POINT, HE REPEATED WHAT HE HAD SAID TO SECRETARY SIMON TO THE EFFECT THAT THE LESSONS OF THE YOM KIPPUR WAR PLUS THE RECEIPT BY THE ARABS OF EVEN MORE MODERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS HAS MADE GEOGRAPHY MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER IN ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC PLANNING. UNDER HIS PLAN, ISRAEL WOULD REQUIRE CERTAIN "CHANGES" AROUND LATRUN, AND ALSO WOULD CONTROL, IN ESSENCE, THE JUDEAN DESERT. THIS WOULD LEAVE 30 PERCENT OF THE WEST BANK WITH ONLY 20,000 ARABS IN THE TERRITORY UNDER GOI CONTROL. THE REST OF THE ARABS WOULD LIVE UNDER JORDANIAN RULE. AS A PART OF HIS PLAN, HE WOULD SUGGEST JORDAN RULE IN AND AROUND GAZA CITY (NOT IN ALL OF GAZA) WHICH WOULD BE A FREE PORT: THERE WOULD BE UNENCUMBERED RIGHT OF PASSAGE ACROSS ISRAELI TERRITORY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 TEL AV 04204 02 OF 02 260843Z

TO AND FROM THE PORT. (ALLON INTERJECTED THAT JORDAN NEVER ACCEPTED HIS PLAN BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WAS EVER GIVEN A FAIR CHANCE SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ROGERS PLAN DESTROYED ANY HOPES THAT HUSSEIN MIGHT BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL.)

10. ALLON THEN TURNED TO THE SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK. HE PREFACED HIS REMARKS BY NOTING THAT AFTER THE EXERCISE ON THE SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT, THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT ON ANYONE'S PART OF THE IMPORTANCE SETTLEMENTS HAVE FOR ISRAEL. ALLON NOTED THAT WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS WERE IMPORTANT FOR TWO REASONS: (1) THE PRESENCE OF THE SETTLEMENTS ENSURED THAT THE DAY-TO-DAY SECURITY WOULD BE "BETTER," AND (2) POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY THE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS WERE AS IMPORTANT TO ISRAEL AS THE SETTLEMENTS ON THE GOLAN. THE SETTLEMENTS

WOULD, OF COURSE, BE IN THE AREA CONTROLLED BY THE GOI, WITH A STRONG ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE. (IN SUPPORTING THE NEED FOR A STRONG IDF PRESENCE ALONG THE JORDAN, ALLON REMARKED THAT THE CYPRUS SITUATION AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THE INABILITY OF THE UN OR BIG POWER GUARANTEES TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR ISRAEL.) AS CONCERNS JERUSALEM, ALLON NOTED THAT HIS PLAN WOULD PROVIDE FOR ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER UNIFIED JERUSALEM WITH CONTROL OVER THE MUSLIM HOLY PLACES GOING TO THE ARAB ENTITY WITH WHICH ISRAEL NEGOTIATED THE AGREEMENT OVER THE WEST BANK (PRESUMABLY JORDAN, BUT HE DID NOT SPECIFY).

11. WHEN HE FINISHED, ALLON ASKED ME TO GIVE HIM MY IMPRESSION OF HIS PLAN. I TOLD HIM I WOULD, OF COURSE, FULLY ASSOCIATE MYSELF WITH HIS DESCRIPTION OF UNDER SECRETARY SISCO'S REACTION TO THE SAME QUESTION; TO WIT, " THE PLAN IS INTERESTING AND INTRIGUING." ALLON LAUGHED AT THE REPLY, NOTING THAT HE OF COURSE DID NOT EXPECT ANY OTHER ANSWER. HE THEN REITERATED THE MAIN POINTS OF THE PLAN, WITH GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE REQUIREMENT FOR ISRAEL TO HAVE STRATEGIC DEPTH. HE STATED THAT HIS PLAN, OR SOMETHING LIKE IT WHICH TOOK INTO ACCOUNT ISRAEL'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, WAS THE MOST THAT ANY ISRAELI GOVT COULD AGREE TO RETURN TO JORDAN. ANYTHING MORE HE SAID, WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO THE "DESTRUCTION OF THE THIRD TEMPLE."

12. COMMENT: ALLON KEPT ME FOR OVER TWO HOURS. HIS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 TEL AV 04204 02 OF 02 260843Z

DETAILED AND FULSOME EXPOSITION OF THE ALLON PLAN MAY HAVE BEEN OCCASIONED BY HIS PRIDE IN AUTHORSHIP AND DESIRE TO TALK ABOUT HIS PET PROJECT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE WILL BE FLOATING THE ALLON PLAN IN WASHINGTON AS A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH JORDAN. BASED ON ALL OF OUR INDICATIONS TO DATE, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT ALLON WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS A "DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT " WITH JORDAN.
KEATING

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